We define a first-order conditional logic in which conditionals, such as a -• 0, are interpreted as saying that normal/commonAypical objects which satisfy a satisfy 0 as well. This qualitative 'statistical' interpretation is achieved by imposing additional structure on the domain of a single first-order model in the form of an ordering over domain elements and tuples, a -* 0 then holds if all objects with property a whose ranking is minimal satisfy 0 as well. These minimally ranked objects represent the typical or common objects having the property a. This semantics differs from that of the more common subjective interpretation of conditionals, in which conditionals are interpreted over sets of standard first-order structures. Our semantics provides a more natural way of modelling qualitative statistical statements, such as 'typical birds fly', or 'normal birds fly'. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization of this logic, and we show that it can be given probabilistic semantics.
Introduction
Conditional logics have been the focus of much AI research in recent years because of their important connection to default reasoning and belief revision. Most work on conditional logic has concentrated on the prepositional case, for example [18, 6, 15, 16] . First-order conditional logics have received less attention, and there does not seem to be agreement on their formulation. This is understandable given that first-order logic is considerably more expressive than propositional logic. This additional expressivity requires one to deal with issues that do not arise in the propositional case, such as the interaction between quantifiers and the conditional operator.
The language of propositional conditional logics contains, in addition to the standard Boolean operators, a binary conditional operator -K These logics are interpreted over a structure that consists of an ordered set S of standard propositional models. The formula a -• /? is satisfied by such a structure if among standard propositional models in S that satisfy a, all those that are minimal with respect to (abbreviated w.r.t.) the ordering satisfy /? as well. While this is just a rough description, for instance, the ordering may be relative to each world or partial, it captures the essence of the semantics. This semantics justifies an intuitive reading of a -• /? as 'in the most normal a worlds, /? holds'.
A natural generalization of this idea to first-order conditional logic is to use a similar interpretation over an ordered set of standard first-order models. There are various issues that this interpretation raises. For instance, should the domain of all these models be the same? Or, should constants be interpreted as rigid designators? Regardless of these choices, the essence of the interpretation is the same, and as before, an informal reading of the conditional a -* /? would be 'in the most normal a worlds, /? holds'. The main difference is that now, a and /? are part of a much richer language.
However, the structure of first-order models provides an alternative interpretation for conditionals. Roughly, we can think of a first-order model as a collection of prepositional structures, each describing the properties of a single object within the domain (or more generally, the properties of some particular tuple of objects). Thus, another possible interpretation of first-order conditional logics is w.r.t. a single first-order structure that is supplemented with an ordering over domain elements. Now, a -• /? is interpreted as saying that 'all objects in the structure's domain that are normal w.r.t. the property a, satisfy /? as well '. There are different manners in which one can enhance a first-order structure. In particular, our choice of an ordering relation over the structure's domain is not the only one. For example, Schlechta's work on defaults as generalized quantifiers [20] , developed independently, 1 adds weak filters to a first-order structure to obtain an interpretation of defaults (or conditionals) that is similar in flavour to ours. We discuss the view of first-order conditionals as generalized quantifiers in Section 4 and Schlechta's work in Section 5.
The two approaches to first-order conditional logics outlined above closely resemble two interpretations of probabilistic statements: the frequentist interpretation and the subjectivist interpretation. While these interpretations have a long history, two recent works on probabilistic logic brought them to the attention of the formal reasoning community in AI. Bacchus [4] and Halpern [14] examine two types of statements about probabilities: statements about subjective beliefs, such as 'the probability that Tweety flies is 0.9', and statistical statements, such as '90% of birds fly'. They suggest that the first type of statement is naturally modeled by a probability measure over a possible-worlds structure, while the second statement can be interpreted by imposing a probability assignment over a single domain. The choice between these interpretations is akin to the choice between the two possible interpretations of firstorder conditionals. Indeed, conditional sentences can be viewed as qualitative counterparts of probabilistic sentences. This is a consequence of the probabilistic semantics of conditionals provided by Adams [1] and by Goldszmidt and Pearl [13] . According to this semantics, and depending on which interpretation of probabilities one chooses, a -• /? can be roughly understood as a statement of subjective belief, i.e. 'in those a worlds I consider most likely, 0 is the case', or as qualitative statistical statements, i.e. 'in the actual world, most objects with property a have property (3 as well'.
In this paper, we formalize this second, statistical interpretation of first-order conditional logics. We interpret conditionals over a standard first-order structure to which we add an ordering over domain elements. More precisely, for every natural number n, there is a total pre-order over the set of n-tuples of domain elements. A conditional of the form <p -•(*) i> is interpreted as saying that all the minima] tuples c of length |x| that satisfy <p when c is substituted for x, must also satisfy rp under this substitution. A natural extension of this semantics imposes restrictions on the possible pre-orders and on the relationship between pre-orders of tuples of different lengths. We explore three variants of this semantics and show that the most powerful of them can be given a probabilistic semantics akin to Goldszmidt and Pearl's e-semantics [13] .
Our work is closely related to Bacchus's work on representing statistical information in first-order logic [4] . Our logic can be thought of as a qualitative counterpart to Bacchus's quantitative approach. Indeed, the formof quantification we use resembles Bacchus' notation, and some of our axioms can be viewed as qualitative counterparts of similar axioms that appear in his work. However, an important difference between the two logics is their expressive power. Bacchus's logic has numbers as objects in the language, and he allows quantification over them, addition, multiplication, and other operations. Our counterpart of probabilities, ranks, are not objects in the language, and we do not manipulate them within the logic.
We believe that making the distinction between the subject!vist and statistical (frequentist) interpretations is as important in qualitative reasoning as it is important in quantitative reasoning. We regularly reason with qualitative statistical information and it is important to distinguish it from subjective beliefs. Qualitative statistical information summarizes our experience in the world. For instance, rather then memorize various instances of flying birds and nonflying birds, we may store our knowledge in the form of a qualitative statistical statement-'common/typical birds fly'. Although this statement may give rise to subjective beliefs about whether or not a particular bird flies, it is not about our subjective beliefs. It is a qualitative assertion about the ratio of birds and flying birds or about the properties of prototypical birds, and it should be interpreted accordingly.
Once the distinction between subjective and statistical conditionals is understood, it can help us approach problems such as the lottery paradox. It is perfectly consistent to state that typical/common tickets will not win the lottery, yet some ticket will win. This has been called a paradox because in some subjective conditional logics, e.g. Delgrande's [9] , the following theory is inconsistent:
It is easy to see why this is the case. Interpreted subjectively, the first sentence says that in our most normal worlds, all tickets will not win, while the second sentence claims that in our most normal worlds a winner exists. This, of course, is a contradiction. Moreover, the first statement does not seem to capture our information about lotteries. The statistical statement that most tickets will not win the lottery is a more plausible one. More importantly, we see that the two interpretations are fundamentally different.
Another example of a theory that is inconsistent under a subjective interpretation is the following:
The subjective interpretation of this theory is that in our most normal worlds, everybody's pets are either dogs or cats, while John's pets are snakes. But clearly, John is someone, so that, based on the first sentence, his pets should be dogs or cats. A statistical interpretation makes more sense here. Under such an interpretation, we would understand these formulas as saying that most/typical people's pets are dogs or cats, but John's typical pets are snakes. As we shall see, both statements are consistent under the qualitative statistical semantics we present.
In Section 2 we provide a formal account of the semantics of first-order statistical conditional logic followed, in Section 3, by a description of a sound and complete axiomatization of this logic. In Section 4, we look at different syntactic and semantic variants of this logic. In particular, we show that our conditional logic can be given probabilistic semantics. We also show that the conditional operator can be replaced by a class of quantifiers or alternatively, by a set of new predicates. This latter formulation leads to a semi-standard first-order language with a much simpler axiom system. We end with a discussion of the logic and its relation with other work. The paper contains two appendices: Appendix A contains the proofs of the theorems presented in the paper, and Appendix B contains a list of symbols. Throughout this paper, we assume familiarity with the basic syntax and semantics of first-order logic.
Language and semantics
We now proceed with a description of the language of statistical conditional logic, a language which extends the language of first-order logic (FOL). This will be followed by a definition of the language's formal semantics.
We assume the existence of an underlying first-order language C, containing (possibly infinite) sets of predicate symbols P, constant symbols C, function symbols F, and variables V. Our language, Cc consists of a set of well formed formulas (wff) defined below using P, C, F andK. DEFINITION 2.1 The set of well formed formulas of Cc is defined inductively as follows:
• Atomic formulas of Cc are wffs (an atomic formula is a predicate symbol with an appropriate number of terms).
• If (p and rp are wffs, then so are -up, <p =*• xp.
• If <p is a wff and x is a variable, then Vxy is a wff.
• If <p and V" are wffs then <p -••(«) H> is a wff.
We shall use the symbols V, A, <=> and 3 freely, with the understanding that they are defined by -i, => and V. We shall use the shorthand x for a sequence of variables x\,..., x n for some fixed n, when n is clear from the context. Notice that we use => to denote material implication and a subscripted -• to denote conditionals.
Intuitively, the conditional <p -*(g) 4> can be read as saying that normal, or typical tuples that can be substituted for x and have the property <p, have the property ip as well. Hence, in this formula, the variables x are implicitly quantified by the conditional operator.
Let us consider a number of examples of wffs and their intuitive interpretation. instructor{x, y) holds when x is y's instructor, like(x, y) holds when x likes y, and clear(x) holds when x's lessons are clear.
instructor(x,y) -*( x , y ) like(x,y).
Here, x and y are implicitly quantified by the conditional operator. This sentence can be read as 'normal instructor/student pairs are such that the instructor likes her student'. 2. Vx(tns<ruc<or(x ! y) -•(y) Hke(x,y)). Here x is universally quantified, while y is implicitly quantified by the conditional operator. This sentence can be read as 'all instructors like their normal (or typical) students'. 3. Vy(instructor(x, y) -*•(*) like(x, y)) can be read as 'all students are liked by their typical instructors'.
(instructor(x, y) -*(") like(x, y)) -*-( x ) clear(x) can be read as 'typically, instructors
who are liked by their typical students are clear'.
Next, we extend the standard definition of free-variables to Cc-
We define the variables of a term as follows:
f(t') then var(t) = var(t').
• Ut = c£C then var(t) = 0.
The free variables of a wff ip (fv(VO) are defined inductively:
• If P(<!, ...,*")is an atomic formula, then fv(P(ti,.. .,<")) = U" =1 var(ti).
• If ip and ij) are wffs, then f\(-«p)=f\ ((p) and fv(<p =>• V ) )=fv(v)U fv(V0-• If ip is a wff and x is a variable, then fv(Vxip) = fv(<p) \ {i}.
• If ^ and V 1 are wffs and x is a set of variables, then fv(y> ->-(j)
In order to define our models, we need the following:
R is a ranking function on D if .ft : D <-*• Q, where ft is a totally ordered set.
We interpret the language Cc over a class of structures consisting of first-order models whose domain elements are ranked. DEFINITION 2.4 A ranked first-order structure is a pair M=(M, R)
• M is a standard first order structure.
• R = {7Zn|n G N), where for each n, Rn is a ranking function on |M| n . 2 We shall use the shorthand notation (a, 6 )=R(C, d) for i?2((a, b)) = i?2((c, d)) (and similarly for other relations). We shall also talk about minimal elements in |M| n , with the understanding that minimality is w.r.t. the ranking Rn. DEFINITION 2.5 Let s : Vars i-c ||M|| be an assignment function. We define the notion of satisfiability of a wff a under s in a ranked first-order structure M=(M., R), written M (= a[s], as follows:
• So far, we have not imposed any additional requirements on the functions Rn. However, there are two properties which we consider quite natural for some interpretations of the ranking R. The first requirement, permutation says that the ranking is indifferent to the order of the elements in the tuple. In essence, this implies that the ranking is defined over bags (or multi-sets) of domain elements, rather then over tuples. The second requirement, concatenation, says that preferences are closed under concatenation. That is, if we prefer c over d and c 7 over d', then we prefer co? over do d'. The definition has two parts, one covering the case of strict preference and another covering the case of non-strict preference.
Permutation and concatenation assert certain independence properties of the ranking R. The former asserts that the ranking of a multi-set of objects is independent of their ordering, while the latter relates the ranking of a tuple to the ranking of its components. We believe that together, these properties imply that the ranking of a multi-set is a function of the rank of its components (see Conjecture 4.5). DEFINITION 2.7 A ranked structure M=(M, R) satisfies permutation if for every n £ N and for every permutation ir over {1,..., n}, we have that Rn{di,.
Consider \ language with three unary predicates: L, M, P. Individuals with the property L (respecthl y. M,P) are good in logic (resp. mathematics, physics). We shall loosely refer to persosi-with the above properties as logicians, mathematicians, and physicists. ) because all minimal objects with property L satisfy ->P. However, notice that there is a logician, Craig, that is good in physics. Hence, A4 ^ VI(L(I) => ->P(x)). Also, notice that in M, normally, a person is not a logician, a mathematician, or a physicist because Alice, the most typical person in the domain, is none of the above. Now suppose we have an additional binary predicate W(x, y), with the intended meaning that x is wealthier than y. Suppose we state that
That is, typical logician/physicist pairs are such that the physicist is wealthier than the logician. We can constrain the ranking over pairs in M as follows in order to satisfy this assertion: (1) (Alice.Bob), (Alice.Craig), and (Alice, Diane), (2) (Bob.Craig) and (Craig.Diane), 
Axiomatization
This section describes a sound and complete set of axioms for the class NS. We use the following shorthand notation:
Notice that a <j /? is read as 'some normal tuples w.r.t. the property a V f3 satisfy a', and a <g /? is read as 'all normal tuples w.r.t. the property a V /? satisfy ->/?'. As we shall see, the former implies that those tuples that are normal for /? are no more normal than those tuples normal for a, while the latter implies that those tuples normal for a are strictly more normal than those tuples normal for /?. For this reason, we use the < and < symbols. The axiom schema for our logic are displayed in Figure 1 .
is the only inference rule in our logic.
Here are intuitive interpretations of these axiom schema. Reflexivity-the normal a objects satisfy a. Hence, normal birds are a subset of the set of birds. Left Equivalence-normal objects for logically equivalent formulas have identical properties. Hence, objects can now be thought of as normal w.r.t. a set, or the property whose extension is that set. Right Weakening & And-properties common to all normal objects for some formula are closed under logical implication. Hence, if small birds normally have small beaks, then RW implies that they normally have beaks. If they normally fly as well, then And implies that they normally have small beaks and fly. Cautious Monotony-if all normal objects for a satisfy /? then the normal objects for a are also normal for a A /?. For example, if Tweety is a normal bird and normal birds fly, then Tweety is a normal flying bird. Or-the normal objects for aV0 are the union of normal objects for a and /?. Rational Monotony-if normal objects of a are j, but some normal objects for a A (3 are not 7, then normal objects for a are not /?. For example, if normal birds fly, but it is not the case that normal birds weighing over 50 kg fly, then normal birds weigh less than 50 kg. Weakening-if all objects have the property /? then in particular, normal a objects satisfy /?. Instantiation-the set of normal objects for a property is nonempty unless there are no objects with this property. Renaming-invariance under renaming of the bound variables. Interchange-if we have a pair of normal and universal quantifiers quantifying over disjoint variables, then their order can be exchanged. For example, 'for any colour, normal children '. Indeed, it does not seem to be necessarily the case that if for any colour, most children can name that colour, then most children can name all colours. As we show later on, the 'most' interpretation can be justified to a certain extent via a probabilistic interpretation of conditionals. However, this latter notion of 'most' may be better represented by the expression 'virtually all'.
The role of Axiom (3.12) in the proof of the completeness theorem is worth mentioning. This axiom guarantees that the models we construct are smooth. Suppose that there is no minimal rank for tuples satisfying a and that the domain is infinite. We can have a model that satisfies Vy(a -•(*) /?), where for each domain element d there is some rank r<j such that (1) there are elements e whose rank is lower than rj such that a[f] is satisfied, and (2) (a ^-/?)£'j ] is satisfied iff c belongs to a rank lower than rj. If we construct the model so that{r,j : a € ||M||} forms an infinite descending chain, the wff (a -••(r) Vy/?) will not be satisfied. Permutation-we can permute the variables bound by the conditional operator. Weak-Concat-if tuples normal for a (resp. a') are as normal as tuples normal for /? (resp. P 1 ) then tuples normal for a A a' are as normal as tuples normal for /? A p 1 . Thus, if Alice is a normal female and Bill is a normal male then (Alice.Bill) is a normal female-male pair. Strong-Concat-similar to (3.14), only with strict inequality. Distribution-we can minimize components separately. Suppose that members of all normal female/male pairs look differently. Hence, it is true that given a normal female, all normal males look different from her. For a countable language £c, axioms (3.1M312) are complete with respect to the class NS.
The proof of the completeness theorem is rather long and appears in the Appendix together with the other proofs. Our construction employs Henkin style witnesses (see [10] ) which are repeatedly added to the language in order to guarantee the existence of the non-normal objects stipulated by the theory. 
Alternative formulations
We present a number of syntactic and semantic variants of our logic. First, we show that the logic can be given probabilistic semantics, and then we show how different syntactic constructs can be used to replace the conditional operator.
Probabilistic semantics
The existence of probabilistic semantics for prepositional conditional logics has been pointed out by a number of authors, for example Adams [1] , Goldszmidt and Pearl [13] , and Lehmann and Magidor [16] . We claim that conditional first-order theories can be given probabilistic semantics similar to that off-semantics [1, 12] . The intuition behind this semantics is as follows: suppose there is a probability distribution Pr defined over the domain of a first-order model M, and let us abuse notation and write Pr(<p(x)) for Pr({d : M (= y(i)G]})-We would like to say that a conditional ip -•(*) i> is satisfied by this model when Pr(ip(x)\(p(x)) is almost 1. That is, with high probability, any element that has the property ip, has the property ip. In order to formalize this intuition we have to say what we mean by 'almost 1' and how we would treat tuples of domain elements, as opposed to single domain elements. We resolve the first question by using the ideas of Goldszmidt et al. [ 12] in their formulation of e-semantics.
Instead of looking at a single probability assignment, we look at a sequence of probability assignments and replace the requirement Pr(ip(x)\tp(x)) is 'almost' 1 with Pr(4>{x)\<p(x)) = 1 in the limit. (An alternative approach is to use non-standard probabilistic measures, where 'almost' 1 means 'infinitesimally close to l',see [16] .) We call this a parameterizedprobabilistic model (PPF). The second problem can be solved by defining separate probability distributions for each tuple size, much like our use of different rankings for different tuple sizes. A nicer solution would be to use the probability distribution over the domain to induce a probability distribution over tuples, i.e. Pr{(d\,..
.,dk)) -Pr{d\) • • Pr(dk).
In that case, we say that the PPF is strong. Unfortunately, our language is not strong enough to force such an interpretation. However, we can obtain this condition by resorting to some form of w-consistency. We conjecture that this property of w-consistency follows from regular consistency when the theory is finite. What follows is a formalization of the discussion above. • M is a standard first-order structure.
• P = {Pr
where Pr k = {Pr* : n G N} is a sequence of probability measures on * Satisfiability of a formula ip in a PPF Mp is defined in the standard fashion, except for the following case:
That is, the conditional /3 -*(g) J is satisfied whenever the probability of the set of substitutions for x under which /? A 7 is satisfied, given the set of substitutions under which /? is satisfied, approaches 1.
We shall also need the following two properties:
We say that a PPF Mp is smooth w.r.t. Cc if for every (possibly infinite) set B of wffs and everywffa: if lim^oo Pr n (/?|a) = 0 for every ^G B thenlinin-oo Pr n {\J p€B /?|a) = 0. We say that a PPF Mp is pointed if for all formulas a, /? G Cc limn-oo Pr n (/?|a) exists.
We chose the term smooth because of its similarity to the smoothness requirement in the context of our standard model: both conditions make Axiom (3.12) valid. The requirement that the PPF be pointed is needed to ensure that Axiom (3.8) (Rational Monotony) will hold. THEOREM 4.3 For a countable language L, axioms (3.1M312) are sound and complete w.r.t. the class of smooth, pointed PPF models. A PPF is strong if for all k, n G N and for all <*i,..., d k G ||M||, we have that -Pr*((di,..., We conjecture the following:
Given a countable language L, for finite theories F, F has a model in NS satisfying permutation and concatenation iff F has a strong PPF model.
While it is easy to define a ranked structure based on a PPF model, we have not been able to prove the other direction.
We remark that Lehmann and Magidor [16] give a slightly different semantics to propositional conditional logics using non-standard probability measures. There is a strong correspondence between non-standard reals and infinite converging sequences of reals. In fact, one way of defining non-standard reals is by means of equivalent classes of converging sequences of standard real numbers. Thus, we believe that the two methods are equivalent.
Syntactic variants
The syntax of our system of statistical conditionals can be changed to highlight different aspects of these conditionals. While we chose to use a formal language similar to that used in conditional logics, we see two other possibilities.
As we mentioned earlier, the conditional <p -••(*) i> tells us something about the properties of a subset of the objects that can be assigned to x such that <p is satisfied. Thus, it can be viewed as a quantifier that is slightly weaker than the universal quantifier, but much stronger than the existential quantifier. Indeed, [7] presents the logic of this paper in this form. Rather than use conditionals, it uses normality quantifiers of the form Af% , where Afj quantifies over all the most normal x satisfying (p. Thus, instead of <p -••(«) V"» one writes Affip. In fact, the universal and existential quantifiers can be shown to be special cases of normal quantifiers (and hence of conditionals). Instead of Vx->a we can write Ng false (or a ->( x ) false). 3 While the use of normality quantifiers presents only a slight syntactical variant to our conditional language, one can take a completely different approach that has a much simpler axiomatization and gives a system that is much closer to standard first-order logic. This approach is based on adding normality predicates, which are counterparts of McCarthy's abnormality predicates [19] . In this approach we add a normality predicate for each wff <p and each subset of variables free in <p. In principle this requires at least a countable number of additional predicates in the language. However, any finite theory will refer only to a finite subset of these predicates.
Formally, if £ is a first-order language, then £^ is the minimal extension of £ such that if ip is a wff with free variables x\,...,x n andti,... ,1* are terms then Norma%^i;£~\ti,..., t k ) is a wff, where *,-,,..., x ih €{*!,..., *»}. 4 The intuitive reading of this formula is best illustrated by an example. Formally, we can revise our definition of satisfiability within a ranked first-order structure by replacing the clause on conditionals by: It may seem that this logic is more expressive than our conditional logic. We have shown that beyond expressing conditionals it allows us to say of a particular object that it is normal. However, we can say the same thing in our original language if it contains equality. To say that Tweety is a normal bird we simply write:
That is, it is not the case that all normal birds are not Tweety. Hence, for a first-order language that contains equality, we can show the following:
The axioms (i)-(vii) are sound and complete w.r.t. the class of NS structures.
Discussion
We presented a first-order conditional logic in which conditionals are interpreted as qualitative statistical statements. Our main contributions are in pointing out this alternative interpretation for conditionals, one that underlies much common-sense knowledge; in providing a formal language for making such statements, including a sound and complete axiomatization; and in pointing out its probabilistic semantics. Our particular approach is motivated by the fact that people seem to possess much information about typical, normal, or expected properties of objects; for example, birds typically fly, the bus usually arrives on time, or physicists are usually good in math. In addition, people seem to possess representations of prototypical objects. (See [21 ] for an interesting discussion of prototypes and empirical studies of their use.) Much of this information is statistical in nature: most birds we encounter fly, most times we wait for the bus it is on schedule, and most physicists we know are good in math. However, most of this information is qualitative, rather than quantitative. Our logic allows us to reason with such statements and our axiomatization and semantics is intended to capture and model them.
Tversky [22] suggests a model of how prototypes are used. In Tversky's model the degree of 'typicality' of an individual w.r.t. a class is determined by its distance from the prototype of this class in the space of properties, where different properties can have a different influence on this metric. While we do not claim that our model wholly captures the common-sense use of prototypes-current theories of prototypes and their use are more involved than Tversky's model-an intuitive interpretation of our semantics is based on these ideas; namely, that objects in our model are ranked based on their similarity to the class prototype. Objects which possess all the typical properties of class a are minimally ranked w.r.t. that class and they may differ from each other on various properties to which the prototype is indifferent. The prototype itself is only implicitly specified as the set of properties common to all minimally ranked objects of the class. Objects from class a that are not minimally ranked have some atypical property, and the degree to which some property (3 is atypical w.r.t. class a is manifested by the distance between the ranking of the most normal a objects versus the ranking of the most normal a A /? objects.
Still, there are problems with logics of prototypes that our proposal suffers from. For example, if Pi fora = 1,..., 10 is atypical property ofclassa.it does not follow that /?i A-• A/?io is a typical property of class a, although this conclusion is sanctioned by all systems which have the And property. It remains to be seen whether a more satisfactory solution that does not suffer from these problems exists. One possibility is to allow a richer structure in which there are different rankings with respect to different properties. 5 In that case, the And property would not necessarily hold. However, it is not clear what relationship should hold between the different rankings, and this approach deserves further study.
As we have seen, the conditional operator can be viewed as a quantifier. The idea of nonstandard quantification is not a new one. In [5] Barwise and Cooper define and treat the subject of generalized quantifiers. Their treatment is very broad and general, having a linguistic aim.
The idea also appears in the field of model theoretic logic, but on a different level and with different aims (for example, quantifiers that quantify over enumerable sets).
A closer approach is presented in Altham's work on formalizing the concept 'many' and 'nearly all' [2] . Altham adds a new quantifier M. In his approach (MI)FI (i.e. many z are F) is satisfied, if at least n distinct individuals in the domain are F. Nearly all x are F (written (Nx)Fx ), if fewer than n members of the domain are not F.
The choice of n that corresponds with the notion of many is different in different contexts, e.g. compare the idea of many Christians to that of many Quakers. To overcome this Altham introduces an infinite set of quantifiers {M l k £ N}, where (M k x)Fx if at least k individuals are F. With every predicate he associates an index that determines how many is many (i.e. which k should be used to say many xs are ys). However, one cannot infer the index of a wff from the indices of its subformulas, but only obtain bounds on its size (e.g. if the index of a is k and of /? is j then the index of a V (3 is bounded below by the maximum of j and *)• Altham's approach is more quantitative than ours, actually counting the number of objects with a given property. Our conditional operator is more flexible in that it leaves this number unspecified and allows for interpretations that are different than those suggested by the notion of many.
Perhaps the work most closely related to ours is Schlechta's work on defaults as generalized quantifiers [20] . Schlechta interprets defaults of the form 'birds normally fly' as saying that 'most birds fly* or that 'the elements of a large or important subset of the set of birds fly'. Hence, as in our logic, defaults (or conditionals) are interpreted w.r.t. a single first-order model. Schlechta formalizes the notion of 'important subset' using a weak notion of a filter. A filter w.r.t. a set A is a set of subsets of A that contains A, that is closed under the superset relation and under intersections. Schlechta replaces this last property with the requirement of non-empty intersections. Hence, Schlechta's semantics consists of a first-order structure sup-
Schlechta's work and our work attempt to formalize similar ideas, but they differ on a number of issues. Schlechta's language contains unary predicates only. Hence, it provides only a limited formalization of first-order conditionals. Consequently, it is less expressive than our logic and does not address issues such as the interaction between normal tuples of different sizes. Schlechta's axiom system is weak and, consequently, more flexible. In fact, restricted to unary predicates, our semantics specializes Schlechta's semantics, since rankings implement a (real) filter which, in turn, is a weak filter. Hence, we have formalized a more specific approach to conditionals. Indeed, while our conditional operator can be given probabilistic semantics as stating statements that are almost certainly true, one possible interpretation of Schlechta's defaults is as stating facts that are true with probability greater than 0.5. Our more specific semantics has the benefit of a simpler representation: whereas one must specify a filter for every subset of the domain in order to handle conditionals in Schlechta's logic, a single ranking on the domain suffices in our case. Finally, it should be mentioned that Schlechta's work is concerned with issues which we have not considered, such as specificity of defaults.
Delgrande [9] was the first to offer a first-order version of conditional logic. His language is restricted to flat formulas, i.e. formulas in which conditionals are not nested. Delgrande interprets his language over a set of possible worlds, all of which are models of first-order logic with a
common domain and valuation function (a function that assigns an individual to each term). A conditional (p(t) -• rp(t) is satisfied if in the least exceptional worlds in which (p(t) holds, rp(t) holds as well. This type of interpretation is characteristic of the subjective approach. The model tells us what worlds the agent perceives as more reasonable, and conditionals are interpreted as talking about the properties of the most likely worlds or scenarios.
Another approach to first-order conditionals is offered by Lehmann and Magidor [17] . Their approach is somewhat different in motivation from the other approaches, and cannot be classified as distinctly subjective or statistical, but rather as a combination of both. Lehmann and Magidor are interested in the study of nonmonotonic consequence relations. A consequence relation is a function which, given a theory, returns the theory containing the consequence of the original theory. In [17] Lehmann and Magidor look at consequence relations defined over first-order theories. Their approach can be embedded in a conditional logic with the restriction that conditionals are fiat, and that conditionals do not appear under the scope of a quantifier. Thus, Vr(6ir<f(z) -> fly(x)) is not a wff, while (Vz6ird(z)) -(Vz//j/(z)) is a wff. This approach extends their earlier work on propositional consequence relations [15, 16] . In particular they are interested in studying when quantifiers can be introduced or eliminated. For instance, one rule they suggest is:
The semantics Lehmann and Magidor provide for their theories takes the form of a partial order over pairs of the form (M, /), where M is a standard first-order model, and / is a function assigning a domain element to each variable. The conditional bird(x) -* fly(x) is satisfied if in those minimal (M, f) pairs in which the object assigned to x by / has the property bird, that object also has the property fty. Thus, the model can be viewed as saying what models are most normal, but also what assignments to objects are most normal. While the ordering over models fits the subjective approach, the fact that there is an ordering over the assignment functions / is more in line with the statistical approach: if one fixes the model M, the ordering over assignment functions can be understood as an ordering over infinite tuples of objects which is closer to the statistical approach. Motivated by the work of Lehmann and Magidor, [7] uses such orders over assignment functions to define the semantics of statistical conditionals.
Compared with these approaches, our approach provides a purely statistical interpretation of conditional first-order logic, employing a general language that does not restrict us to flat formulas, nor does it restrict the use of quantifiers.
In [11] Friedman et al. discuss a number of problems that arise in the logic of Delgrande and in other formulations of first-order conditional logic. We mentioned these problems in the introduction, and here we demonstrate our ability to deal with them. The first problem arises when we substitute terms for universally quantified variable: in Delgrande's logic the following is inconsistent:
Vx,y(Pet(x,y) -(Dog(y) V Cat(y)) , Vy(Pet(John,y) -> (Snake(y)).
This inconsistency stems from our ability to substitute John for the variable i in the first sentence, obtaining a sentence that says that John's typical pets are dogs or cats. This contradicts the second statement which says that John's pets are typically snakes (assuming, of course, that snakes are not dogs or cats). In our language, in order to express similar information, we would write Pet(x, y) -+(r,y) (Dog(y) V Cat(y)). That is, normally, a person's pet is either a dog or a cat. Because this form of quantification is weaker than universal quantification, substitutions for x or y are not allowed.
An instance of a similar problem is the lottery paradox. We know that most tickets do not win the lottery, but there is a winning ticket. The theory:
Vx(irue -• ->Winner{x)) , true -* 3xWinner(x)
is inconsistent in Delgrande's logic and Friedman et al. overcome this problem using the properties of plausibility spaces. However, if we use statistical conditionals to represent similar information we obtain the following theory:
It is easy to construct an NS model of this theory. Indeed, in many cases, the information we have about the world is best interpreted as rough, qualitative statistical statements and should be modelled accordingly. If we are careful to make the distinction between subjective and statistical information, we can prevent some of the above pitfalls. However, it is important to note that the lottery paradox still possess a challenge to the subjective approach: it is not unreasonable to argue that the following (subjective) statement is consistent: 'For every given ticket, I believe that that ticket will not win the lottery. Yet, I believe that some ticket will win the lottery*. It seems that these statements, again, correspond to the following theory:
Vz(true -• -iWinner(x)) , true -* 3xWinner(x)
with conditionals interpreted subjectively. Only now, we have made this challenge more crisp because it is not conflated with statements such as 'most tickets will not win the lottery'.
Our logic does suffer from a number of weaknesses. On the technical side, it would be nice to do away with the smoothness requirement, especially in the context of the probabilistic semantics. This may not be too difficult, since this restriction has been overcome in the propositional case [6] . 6 On the more pragmatic side, the fact that we cannot substitute terms for variables bound by the conditional operator also means that we cannot conclude fly(Tweety) from bird(x) -*( x ) fly( x )-That is, although we know that most/normal birds fly, we have no mechanism to deduce that Tweety is one of these normal birds. This is not surprising, since we cannot conclude that Tweety flies given a statistical statement such as '99% of all birds fly'. In order to handle this we would need additional nonmonotonic machinery. For instance, one would like to deduce that an object satisfying a formula is normal for that formula unless the opposite is known, i.e. Tweety is a normal bird unless we can prove otherwise. Such deductions are not possible within our logic, which is a monotonic formalism.
The problem we just alluded to is a fundamental problem at the heart of statistical reasoning: Given statistical information, what is it that we should believe about particular individuals? That is, if we know that 99% of birds fly, what should we believe about Tweety. The problem we are facing now is simply the qualitative counterpart of this old problem. Recently, Bacchus et al. [3] have proposed a solution to this problem in the quantitative case, i.e. they suggest a method for moving from statistics to beliefs. At this stage it is not clear whether their ideas can be used to solve the qualitative version of this problem, and this remain an important challenge. This paper did not attempt to resolve this question. However, it supplies a necessary first step to the resolution of this problem by making explicit the distinction between statistical and subjective conditionals and by supplying a logic for reasoning about statistical statements. We believe that a natural next step is to provide a semantically appealing logic that combines both statistical and subjective conditionals, using which the relationship between both types of information can be studied.
A Proofs
• The proofs of some of the lemmas and derived rules appearing in this section have been lifted to the first-order case from similar proofs appearing in Lehmann and Magidor's [16] . To acknowledge this, we have marked each such claim with (LM*).
• We observe that the proof of the deduction theorem trivially generalizes to our logic, and hence we will (implicitly) allow ourselves to use it in our proofs.
• We shall use => to denote meta-level implication. As before, object-level implication is denoted by =>. • (3.2H3.8) arc all easily proven as in the prepositional case (e.g. see [15,16] ). For instance, consider(3.5): suppose that M \= (or -•(!) P) A (a -•(») 7). Thus, all minimally ranked tuples satisfying a satisfy p. Clearly, all minimally ranked tuples satisfying or A p satisfy p. We conclude that the minimally ranked tuples of d and of oAJ3 are the same. Consequently, since M ^ a -•(») 7, they must satisfy 7.
Some additional derived rules (A.I) -,{a ->(,) 0) => 3x(a A -./?) PROOF. Assume ->32(a A ->0). This is equivalent to V2(-ior v/3). Using (3.9) we have ->or ->•(,) (->a V/3). By Reflexlvlty or -•(j) a. Using (And), we have a -•(,) ((-^a v/3) A a). Using (R.W.), we now have a ->(t) /3.I (A2) -.(or -(I) 0) => 3s[(a A -./?) A ((a -(i) 7) => (a =• T))]

PROOF. WE will show that the negation of the consequence, 3x[(or A -./?) A ((or -*(i) 7) =J> (a => 7))] implies that a -•(!) 0-The negation of the consequence is logically equivalent to Vi[->o V/?v((a -•(!) 7)Aor A-^)]. By following the steps taken in the proof of A.I, we get a -*(i) [0v((a ~*(t) 1) A or A-17)]. Reasoning by cases, suppose that a -"-(i) 7, using And (conjoining 7 to the consequence of the conditional) and a few PC deductions we get a -*(±) 0-Alternatively, if ->(a -*(i) 7), then using (3.9) we have a -'(1) -•(or -+(i) 7). As in the previous case, using (And) and a number of PC deductions we can deduce or -*(t) 0-B (A.3) -.(or ->•(,) 0) A (a -•(!) 7) => 3x(a A 7 A ->0)
PROOF. By A. 1 it is enough to show that (-.(a-•(,)/?) A or -*(!) 7) => ->(o -•(!) (-17 V/3)), but this is equivalent to (o -+(j) (-n V 0) A a ->(i) 7) => (a ->( j) 0) which we get using And and R.W.. I (A.4) 3xa(x)=>ar^( j) Vj/(7(r,v)V-.(a-. (1) 7(2,S7))) (C n (x U fv(o)) = 0). PROOF. First, notice that the following schema is derivable: First, (or -•(,) 7)v->(o -••(,) 7) is an instance ofanFOL tautology. Next, notice that ip -*(x) vis derivable from <p using (3.9) (because from <p we get V£v> using FOL). Hence, we have that (a -+(*) T)V(O -*(X) ->(a -*(j) 7))-Using Right Weakening on both disjuncts, we obtain (a -*(x) (7 v ->(or -*(x) ~f))-
PROOF, (Q V ^) -* (I) (a V /3) implies that (o V 0) -» (I) ^H(oV /?) -•(,) (o A -.0) (by And). Thus (or V P) -* (1 ) -.(3h(oV /?) -•(,) o (by R.W.). Using CM. one gets that ((or V p) -^ t) ->/3) => (((a V /3) A a) -*(i) ->/3). Using (LJ£.) the consequence in this implication implies a -*(x) -<P. B (A.7) (a -+(,) false) => ((a A 0) -> (j) false) (LM*)
PROOF. We have that a -•(!) false »a^(j)/3A-i/3 and using R.W. we obtain or -•(») false t-a -•(*) /SUsing CM. we now have a -*(i) false A a -*(i) /3 H (or A /3) ->(i) false. I (A.8) (ov/3v 7 )-(I) (-.a A-./3)l-(/?V 7)-(l)
-
Using CM. one obtains: (o v/3 V7)->( t ) (-ia A-i/3) h ((o V/3 V7) A (^ V7))-•(,)-i/3 and L.E. gives us the desired result I (A.9) (a V P) -(i) -.or h (or V p v 7) -(I) ^o (LM*)
PROOF. From PC, we have (or v p) ^X) ->o h (a v ;3) -•(,) ->o. By Reflexlvlty we have h (7 A -ior) ->(i) (7 A --or) and using R.W. we have I-(7 A ->o) -*(i) -•<». Using Or we have (orV/9) -+(,) -10 I-((or V/3) V (7A-10)) ->•(!) ->Q) .Since (a V/3) V (7 A ->a) is logically
• (3.9) is also trivial.
• (3.10) Immediate from definition.
• (3.11) Immediate.
• ( Next, notice that if co c* is minimal in (a A a') and the conditions on the variables in Axiom (3.14) are satisfied, then 5 is minimal in a and c 1 is minimal in a': clearly, S satisfies a and € satisfies a'. If some I satisfies a and is ranked lower than c, then using concatenation, we will have a tuple satisfying a A a' whose rank is lower. It is now easy to obtain die soundness of Axiom (3.14): let Z be minimal in d andc' minimal in a'. We know that S o £* must be minimal in a A a'. (Otherwise, another tuple that is ranked lower than So c' is minimal in this set, and as we have seen this implies that either £ is not minimal ford, ore' is not minimal fora'.) If <Jis minimal in 0 and i' is minimal in /?', then we know that d o <? is minimal for/3 f\p', and that Sis ranked no higher than Jand mat £' is ranked no higher than 1'. Consequently, concatenation implies that c o c* is ranked no higher than & o i', which is what we had to prove. Choose some Jnormal for a and let i' be any tuple normal foro'R] and assume that a A or -»(i,y) 7 We must show that (Jo J' is in 7. We notice that because £ U fv(a') = 0 &' is in fact normal for or'. (a A a') . Let Jot? be minimal in (a A a'). As we have argued above, given the restrictions on the free variables of a and or'and on x and y, this implies that c is minimal in d and that i' is minimal in a'. However, d cannot be ranked higher than 5, and similarly, d' cannot be ranked higher than S 1 . Hence, by concatenation, d o d' cannot be ranked higher than JoJ*, and must therefore be minimal in (a A or'). For a countable language Cc, axioms (3.1 M3.12) are complete with respect to the class NS. Before we start the proof, we mention that we will need a syntactic notion of substitution. We will use the same notation as in the case of the (semantic) assignment function, but which one is intended would be clear from the context. The definition will be identical to the one used in first-order logic, where basically, o[J] says that we must substitute the constant c £ Cc forall those instances of x in the wff a, where x appears free in a. SoAfan( (x) . Thus, syntactic substitution defines a mapping from C c to C C -PROOF. Let Cc be a countable language and t a consistent set of closed wffs in Cc • We shall build a model M s.t. (such that) M \= t. We shall construct the model in w stages. Each stage will deal with one negated conditional -(a-(*) 0)-At each stage we will define five sets Ln,r n ,Fn. E n and E". We initialize Lo.ro.Fo andEo as follows: • Lo = Cci To 3 T, is a maximal consistent set of closed wffs. (We remark that consistency is defined as usual and if T is maximal consistent, then for all a 6 L we have a G T or ->a £ F.) • F o = 0.
Given our assumptions, to show that Jo d' £ 7, it is sufficient to prove that i o 5! is minima] in
• E o is an enumeration of pairs of wffs in L o denned as {{a,(3) | -•{a -<•(,) P) £ To}.
• E° = E o . . F n+1 = F n u/ n°+1 where /» +1 = (cj +1 ,...,c^J).
• E n+ i is an arbitrary enumeration of pairs (a',f}') s.t. (or' A/3') e L n +i \ L n and-i(o' ->(j) /3') 6 r n +i.
• E n+1 is the enumeration obtained by using Cantor's diagonalization method to order the elements of Eo, •.
•, E n +i-Define L = (Jl n , T = (Jr n , F = |jF n . It is clear that T is maximal consistent in L, because each of the r n is maximal consistent in L n for each n € N and the union itself is consistent (since T n C T n +i). 
PROOF. Ifo isr-consistentthen-i(o -•(!) -*<*) € T, otherwise by Reflodvity and
And one has a -*(t) false e F => V£-ior £ r, contradicting a's F-consutency. Therefore, it is enough to prove the second part of the lemma. There exist some n s.L a,p e L n \ L n .i and due to our construction process, this means -1(0 ->(i) P) G T n \ T n _i. The fact that -*(a -» (i) ^) £ T n implies that (o,^> £ E n . Therefore, there exists some m > n s.t. we have chosen to deal with the pair (a, P) in the mth stage.
'This definition is from [8] . We can now define our model M = (M,R).
• M is the standard FOL structure defined by the standard part of T (as in [10] ).
• R = {i? n |n £ N} where R k is a ranking function over ||Af||* that we will now construct Fix some integer n. We will now construct the ranking R n . The construction is identical for every n. a ~ 0fora,0 £ Si
We can conclude from the previous lemmas that ~ is an equivalence relation. We denote the equivalence class of a by a, we will denote the set of equivalence classes by E. The relationship H on formulas induces an ordering over equivalence classes in E defined below. PROOF, g u minimal in p. Therefore by Lemma A.I 5, /3 = 5 and hence, aHp. We also have diat g is normal for a and g\=-P-Therefore (by Lemma A.8), g is normal for p. I Note that g € F => 3a € S s.t. g is normal for a . Because Lemma A.1S tells us that if g is minimal for a it is in F, we can conclude that if g is minimal for a then g is normal for a. Proof of completeness theorem: We now show that M \= t. Since our original set of wffs f C T, this is enough. By induction on the structure of a € F we show that A) )= a # a £ T. We have implicitly assumed that {=}£ L. The generalization to languages containing equality proceeds as in the Henkin's proof for standard first-order logic. (Details of that proof can be found in most texts on mathematical logic. Enderton's [10] is a good choice.) There are a number of cases we must consider, but because we basically augmented Henkin's proof to deal with the conditional operator, the standard steps are conducted as in Henkin's proof. Hence we only mention the additional steps that are required here.
• a is an atomic formula, a negation (a = ->/?) or an implication (or = 0 ^ 7) . We proceed as in Henkin's completeness proof for FOL (see [10] (pp. 132-133)).
• a = Vr/3. To follow Henkin's proof we need to extend the substitution lemma to our language, and to use the following lemma: 
=^M*=-(P -(,) 7)[*].
Finally, we note that in order to imitate Henkin's proof we need to establish the semantic and syntactic equivalence of alphabetic variants. The syntactic equivalence is proven using Axiom (3.11) (Renaming) for the case of normally quantified wffs. The semantical equivalence follows from soundness. I • If / G F, g € F \ F then f< n g
• If both /, g 6 F \ F then let Jt be the number of domain elements comprising / that are normal for some formula and let m be the number of domain elements comprising g that are normal for some formula: -iffc> nthen/<a3; -if it = n then /=R5; -iffc < nthen/ > R g. If So J is normal for some wff a then there is some wff for which £ is normal. Next, assume tJiat both & and 1' are normal for some wff. We know that if / <R g and g is normal for some wff a then / £ F. This follows from the definition of <R. Hence, by definition of F, there is some wff for which / is normal. Therefore, we know that all of 5, c*, J, i' are normal for some wff. We continue the proof under this assumption.
PROOF. We claim that
Let a be such that £ is normal* for a , and let £* be normalp for a'. Let P be such that J is normal* for P , and let d' be normalp for p. We claim that £ o 5 1 is normalj,p for a A a' and that Jo d' is normally for P A /?'. This easily follows from (3.16), as we have shown in Claim A.2 above.
We must now show that (a A a')Tl(p A /?'). This easily follows by using (3.14). The stronger relation follows from Axiom 3.15. I Recall that we assume no relation between the probability distributions defined on different tuple sizes of domain elements (i.e. the probability over singletons and pairs is unrelated). Therefore, whatever construction we use to construct the probability distribution on one tuple size can be used for any other tuple size. Therefore, we shall concentrate on the construction of a probability distribution over (single) domain elements.
Let F be some consistent theory. From Theorem 33 we know that this theory has a model M containing a countable number of objects (this follows from the construction of the model). First, we enumerate the elements of this model's domain. This will also induce an enumeration of the domain elements within each rank. We will now construct a sequence of probability distributions, PT\ , Prj,..., such that for each m G N, Pr m will assign positive probability only to a subset of the domain containing the elements of the m most normal ranks. These distributions will always observe the constraint that the probability of each domain element conditional on the set of elements in its rank is equal to 1/2* if it is thefcth element of its rank and there is an infinite number of elements in this rank. If there is a finite number of elements in a rank, all of them will be equi-probable.
It remains to define the probability ofeach rank in each of Pri,Pr 2 In Pr n we set the probability of the most likely rank to be /?". We set the probability of all other ranks among the n most normal ranks to be (1 /n) of the probability of the previous rank. Pn is chosen so that the probabilities of these ranks assigned positive probability sum up to 1. All other ranks are assigned probability 0. From now on we ignore p n since it is irrelevant to the conditional probabilities, in which we are interested.
Notice that this construction has the following property. Let c be some domain object and let A be the set of all domain objects ranked higher than c. Then lim n -oo Pr(A\A u {c}) = 0. To see this, suppose that Pr n (c) -1/2*/?, where p is the weight ofe's rank and k is a constant. But, Pr n (A) < P • £2"_ : ^-
We must now show that this PPF models F. First, suppose that tp -*(*) ifeP. This means that in M all minimal elements satisfying <p satisfy i> as well. Suppose that the conditional probability of the minimal elements satisfying ip wj.t. their entire rank is r. Notice that this value is fixed and positive for all Pr t> 1 < t < oo. Since any element satisfying <j> A -it/>mustbe in a higher rank, we have that Pr n (->ip\tp) < 2r/n. Thuslim n -oo P '"(-•V'lv) = 0.
Suppose now that tp ->( x ) 4> $. T. This means that in the minimal rank of elements satisfying ip there is one satisfying t/>. The conditional probability of this element wit. its rank is some fixed r > 0. We have that
PT n (-'il'\v>) = Pr n (->tl>\min x ip) • Pr n (min x <p\<p) > r •
(where mini<P are those minimal elements satisfying ip). Thus, lim n -oo Pr(%l)\ip) = r > 0.
Finally, we have to show that our models are smooth and pointed. To see that the model is smooth, suppose that for some wffo linin-oo Pr n (/3|a) = 0 for every p in some set of wffs B. By our construction, for this to be the case, the minimal element with property (3 A a for any /? 6 B is ranked higher than the minimal elements with property a. Hence, that is true for the set of all elements with some property in {/?AQ|/3 6 B}. By our construction, the probability of this set of elements among the set of elements with property a approaches 0 in the limit.
In order to see that the model is pointed, we must show that if a,P 6 Cc thenlim n -«> Pr n (p\a) exists. Let A be the set of elements with property a and B be the set of elements wirh property oA/J, and let mA, mB be the respective set of minimal elements in A and B. From our construction it is clear that lim n -oo Pr n {B\A) = lim n _oc Pr n (mB\mA).
It is easy to see that our construction guarantees that this limit exists. I THEOREM 4.6 The axioms (iHvii) are sound and complete WXL the class of NS structures.
PROOF. This proof relies on the expressive equivalence of Cc in£jv discussed in Section 4.2 under the assumption that both languages contain equality. For the completeness theorem this requires extending our completeness theorem to such languages. Once we add the appropriate first-order axioms for equality, our Henkin-style proof proceeds much in the same manner. As in the standard case, what is obtained is a model in which equality really only stands for an equivalence relation. But by moving into a model in which the object! are these equivalence classes instead of the original objects (the quotient structure), we obtain the desired representation. See [10] for additional details. Completeness-We have seen that we can encode the conditionals of CQ in Cfj. That is, we can express in Cfj statements that are satisfied in a smooth ranked structure iff the conditional statement is satisfied. Hence, if we show that we can derive from these seven axioms sentences that are equivalent to Axioms (3.1M3.12), we can conclude that any theory that is consistent wxL OMvii) will also be consistent wxt. axioms (3.1M3.12) in its C c form. By our completeness theorem, this implies that it has a model. Since the definition of satisfiability coincides in both models (that is the conditions under which a Cc sentence is satisfied are identical to the conditions under which the equivalent C N sentence is satisfied), we know that this is a model of our original theory. 
